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INTRODUCTION
For a number of reasons - notably its limited administrative
resources - the European Commission ("the Commission") seems to
be relying increasingly on methods of competition law enforcement
based on informal pronouncements (press releases, oral statements,
etc.) and soft law instruments. 3 Surprisingly, and in stark contrast
with the extensive body of literature devoted to the Commission's
more muscular enforcement initiatives 4 under Articles 81 and 82
I Nico1as.Petit@ulg.ac.be.
2RatoM@howrey.com. The views expressed in this paper cannot be attributed to Howrey
LLP or any of its clients. The authors thank E. Fegatilli, M. Heim, E. Provost and T. Soames
for their helpful comments.
3 Despite the fact that the very idea that sunshine enforcement techniques are on the rise
when compared to traditional competition law enforcement mechanisms can be disputed. Indeed,
a number of observers have noted that the Commission's formal enforcement powers have
increased with the adoption of Regulation 1/2003. See generally, on soft law instruments,
U. MORTH, "Soft Law in Governance and Regulation; An Interdisciplinary Analysis", Edward
Elgar Pub, 2004, pp. 37-38.
4 In particular through the steep increase in the fines imposed in cartel cases and through the
numerous Article 82 EC procedures opened lately.
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EC and the EC Merger Regulation ("the ECMR"),5 the pervasive
use of soft law and informal legal instruments in European Commu-
nity ("EC") competition policy has gone relatively unnoticed. 6
In our view, these alternative mechanisms of competition law
enforcement raise many important legal questions - not only the-
oretical but also of very significant practical relevance. For
instance, is compliance with such instruments mandatory? Are
they amenable to judicial review? Can they introduce new legal
standards that depart from established case-law? To what extent
can they be relied upon as a reference for competitive assessments,
etc. ?
The aim of this article is therefore to provide a broad picture of
the various formal and informal instruments through which the
Commission carries out the soft enforcement of EC competition
rules. We refer to them as "sunshine" enforcement instruments and
explain the reasons behind this label in Section 1. We then provide
a typology of those various instruments in Section II. Finally, we
explore their advantages and drawbacks in Sections III and IV
respectively. Section V concludes.
1. - "SUNSHINE" ENFORCEMENT AND ITS RELEVANCE
FOR EC COMPETITION LAW
At the end of the XIXth century, in the United States, the
railway regulator devised a method of intervention based on the
belief that if it disclosed to the public information about any
excessive pricing (or profits) by railway companies - in particu-
1ar through the release of informal statements, reports, studies,
etc. - those operators would have no choice but to slash their
5See Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentra-
tions between undertakings, OJ L 24, 29.01.2004, pp. 1-22.
6 To date, only a limited number of studies have dealt with this issue. See for instance,
H.A. COSMA and R. WHISH, "Soft Law in the Field of ED Competition Policy", (2003) European
Business Law Review 25; In the field of State aid, see M. CINI, "The soft law approach: Com-
mission rule-making in the ED's state aid regime", Journal of European Public Policy, 8 :2, 2001,
pp. 193-196. More generally, see G FALKNER, O. TREIB, M. HARTLAPP and S. LEIBER, "Com-
plying with Europe: ED harmonisation and soft law in the member states", (2005) Cambridge
University Press, pp. 221-227, Linda A.J. SENDEN, "Soft law and its implications for institutional
balance in the EC", Utrecht Law Review, http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/, Volume 1, Issue 2
(December) 2005.
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prices. 7 In other words, through the disclosure of information to
a large audience (including the customers, suppliers and compet-
itors of railway companies as well as the general public), the rail-
way regulator shone a bright light on the behaviour it wished to
influence, thereby giving rise to the expression "sunshine regula-
tion".8
Recent trends in the enforcement of EC competition law lead us
to believe that sunshine regulation is making its appearance in
Europe over a century after its inception. In this paper we use the
expression sunshine enforcement loosely to refer to methods of
enforcement which aim to reveal to the public not only (i) the anti-
competitive behaviour of specific firms, but also (ii) abstract cate-
gories of anticompetitive practices through the adoption of general
soft law instruments. 9
First, it appears that the Commission is becoming increasingly
vocal in the context of its enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC.
This is borne out by the "growing" number of press releases, infor-
mal statements, academic articles, papers, etc. issued by the Com-
mission itself or authored by Commission officials. Whilst the
majority of these public interventions are in theory of a purely
informative nature, they have, in practice a variety of other func-
tions. 10 For instance, following the Court of First Instance's
("CFI") dismissal of the appeal brought by Microsoft against the
Commission's decision of 2004, Commissioner Kroes made the fol-
lowing statement:
"The Court has upheld a landmark Commission decision to give consumers
more choice in software markets. That decision set an important precedent in
terms of the obligations of dominant companies to allow competition,' in par-
ticular in high tech industries". 11
7 See P.C. CARSTENSEN, "Law and Economics Through History: McCraw's prophet of regula-
tion", (1984) Harvard University Press, pp. 885-886; See also C. HENRY, "Public service and
competition in the European Union", (1997) International Advances in Economic Research, Vol. 3,
pp. 265-267.
sSee H. DUMEZ et A. JEUNEMA1TRE, "Les institutions de la regulation des marches: Etude
de quelques modeles de reference", (1999) 1 Revue Internationale de Droit Economique ll, p. 20.
9See F. WILOKMANS, F. TUYTSOHAEVER and A. VANDERELST, Vertical Agreements in EC Com-
petition Law, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 36-41 (title: "Hard and Soft EC competition law").
10 See G. MAJONE, "Regulation in Comparative Perspective", Journal of Comparative Policy
Analysis: Research and Practice, 1999, pp. 309-324.
11 See Commission Press Release, Commission welcomes CFI ruling upholding Commission's
decision on Microsoft's abuse of dominant market position, MEMOj07j359 of 17 September 2007.
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Shortly thereafter, the Commission created on DG Competition's
website a page highlighting its enforcement activities in the Infor-
mation and Communications Technologies ("ICT") sector, thereby
sending a message not only to firms in that sector, but also to the
public that it intended to "closely monitor the information indus-
try, consumer electronics and internet sectors in order to ensure
compliance of market players with ED competition law". 12
Second, the Commission seems to be making increasing use of soft
law instruments to provide legal guidance to firms (but also to the
National Competition Authorities ("NCAs") and courts of ED Mem-
ber States) through a diverse array of curiously named documents,
such as staff discussion papers, position papers, non-papers, consul-
tation papers, notices, guidelines, communications, opinions. 13
Whilst we recognize that theses types of instruments are generally
designed to assist firms in complying voluntarily with EC competi-
tion law (thereby achieving a form of "sunshine" enforcement),14
our analysis also suggests that they serve another related "sun-
shine" enforcement purpose: their wide dissemination may increas-
ingly allow suppliers, customers, competitors, or contractual part-
ners of firms whose conduct breaches Articles 81 and 82 EC to
detect such breaches and to assist competition authorities in bring-
ing them to an end through follow-on actions on the basis of con-
ventional enforcement mechanisms. 15
While its advantages are obvious, sunshine enforcement may how-
ever be a double-edged sword for competition authorities. It is a well-
established general principle of EC law that the Commission, in
adopting measures that define its future conduct or that interpret the
law, places a limit on the enforcement discretion it enjoys. 16
12See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/IOT/overview_en.html.
13 From a purely normative standpoint, these soft law instruments are closer to the concept
of regulation rather than enforcement in so far as they are general in scope and do not apply
the provisions of the EO Treaty ex post or contemporaneously to the infringing conduct. In our
view, however, they represent a different type of competition law enforcement that takes place
ex ante. By contrast to traditional forms of regulation, these instruments (i) are not adopted fol-
lowing a formal legislative procedure; (ii) do not give rise to the same rights and obligations; and
(iii) are primarily designed to assist competition authorities and courts in applying the compe-
tition rules and private parties in complying with them. See, similarly, H.A. OOSMA and
.i' R. WHISH, supra at p. 28.
14 Of course, our interpretation of the concept of "enforcement" could be criticized, if only
because firms complying with the soft law instruments are in principle insulated from formal
enforcement actions.
15Such as complaints to competition authorities or proceedings brought before national
courts.
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II. - A REVIEW OF THE VARIOUS
"SUNSHINE" ENFORCEMENT INSTRUMENTS
As noted above, the Commission has so far relied on a myriad of
"sunshine" enforcement instruments which differ in scope (general
v. individual), author (the Commission itself, DG Competition, indi-
vidual Commission officials, third parties, etc.), purpose (publicity,
guidance, etc.) form (written or oral), 17 and binding effect. 18 For
this reason, it is difficult to propose a homogeneous typology of
"sunshine" enforcement measures based on clear distinguishing fea-
tures and with bright-line boundaries. We therefore try to group
them according to certain obvious common characteristics and
order them, where possible, from least to most formal. Based on
this subjective classification, we (i) briefly describe each type of
legal instrument identified; (ii) examine the goals usually pursued
with its adoption; and (iii) consider whether it has binding legal
effects on the Commission and/or on third parties.
A. - Oral statements
In a world driven by information, Competition Commissioners,
individual DG Competition officials and spokespersons often convey
enforcement messages to the general public through oral state-
ments. Speeches given at international symposiums, interviews and
press conferences offer convenient opportunities to announce new
enforcement actions, provide insider explanations of the Commis-
sion's analysis in specific cases, and send warnings to firms sus-
pected of a violation of EC competition law. Whilst over 'the past
twelve years, the three successive Competition Commissioners
appear to have been equally vocal - we have found no evidence of
an increase in the number of speeches delivered by Competition
Commissioners - the content and implications of their public pro-
nouncements seem to be, however, a question of individual person-
16 On the basis of the principles of legitimate expectations, "estoppel", legal certainty and
"patere legem quam ipse fecisti".
17 Oral statements are by their very nature less likely to prove authoritative than written
acts, which may be circulated more widely.
18 We do not examine other less orthodox - but by no means less effective - forms of inter-
vention such as information purposefully leaked to the press by regulators, etc. See, for a good
account of this phenomenon, M. HElM, "The Impact of the Media on ED Merger Decisions",
(2003) 2 European Competition Law Review 49.
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ality. Commissioners such as Karel Van Miert or Neelie Kroes are
well-known for their powerful - and often controversial - state-
ments. I9
Commission officials cannot, in principle, divulge information or
express opinions on the Commission's activities. 20 The statements
made by individuals employed by the Commission are, however,
not all covered by the same rules. First, Commissioners are not civil
servants within the meaning of the Staff regulations and enjoy a
legal mandate to represent the Commission in public. Second, the
Commission's spokespersons, who are called upon to discuss the
Commission's activities before the media, enjoy a general authori-
zation, within the meaning of Article 17 of the Staff regulations, to
make public statements that convey information received in the
line of duty not otherwise available to the public. All other civil
servants must obtain the authorization to disclose information on
the Commission's enforcement activities. This being said, Commis-
sion officials regularly comment in public on ongoing investigations
or decisions adopted. In practice, only the highest ranking civil
servants - such as Directors General, Deputy Directors General,
Directors, Heads of Unit and cabinet members - make such state-
ments. In this context, Commission officials usually take extreme
care to ensure that they speak "in a personal capacity", and that
"the views expressed [by them] are not an official position of the
European Commission".
Although the topic has not generated a great deal of interest from
legal scholars - perhaps due to the mistaken belief that such oral
statements are devoid of legal content or effect - the question
whether oral statements have legal implications seems to have been
settled by the Community courts. First, in Air France v. Commis-
sion the CFI confirmed that an oral statement by the Commission's
spokesman was a legal act in so far as it produced legal effects and,
19For instance, a few months ago, Commissioner Kroes publicly rebuked the United States'
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust for his "totally unacceptable" criticism of the CFI rul-
ing in the Microsoft case. See T. BUCK, "Kroes rebuffs US on Microsoft ruling", Financial Times,
19 September 2007.
.~ 20 Articles 17(1) and 17a(I) of the Staff Regulations provide as follows: "An official shall
refrain from any unauthorised disclosure of information received in the line of duty, unless that
information has already been made public or is accessible to the public"; "An official has the
right to freedom of expression, with due respect to the principles of loyalty and impartiality".
See Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
civil_servicejdocsjtocIOO_en.pdf.
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as such, could be the object of a direct challenge by individual
applicants. 21 In that case, the spokesman had announced that a
proposed concentration between two companies fell outside the
scope of the ECMR because it did not have a Community dimen-
sion. 22 Subsequent case-law confirms that formal oral pronounce-
ments by Commission officials are likely to constitute legal acts. 23
By contrast, "off-the-record" statements are immune from judicial
scrutiny. 24
Second, oral statements may limit the enforcement discretion of
the Commission and, as a result, be relied upon by affected parties
to challenge a formal Commission decision. In Roberts and Roberts
v. Commission, the CFI reviewed the substance of a public speech
given by a Commission official on specific aspects of the application
of competition law to pub contracts. 25 The Court sought to deter-
mine whether the legal standard applied in a subsequent formal
decision adopted by the Commission was consistent with the legal
test outlined in the speech. Whilst the Court found no discrepancy
between the content of the speech and the decision, the mere fact
that it embarked on such an assessment implies that oral state-
ments may be considered as representing the Commission's official
policy, and as a result can create legitimate expectations for third
parties.
It is therefore clear that oral statements can give rise to a legal
duty, on the part of the Commission (and, conversely', to rights ben-
21 See Case T-3f93, Air France v. Commission, [1994] E.C.R. II-121 at §§46-48.
22 A Commission spokesman had stated publicly that a proposed concentration between Brit-
ish Airways and Dan Air did not meet the turnover thresholds for the application of the ECMR.
The statement followed non-binding letters (i) from a Director of the Commission disclaiming
that he did not represent the Commission's views and (ii) from the Commissioner for competition.
Air France, a competitor, challenged the statement. The CFI considered that the statement
could be the subject of judicial review under Article 230 EC. The statement had legal effects on
the Member States (it confirmed the jurisdiction of the Member States to review the transaction)
and on the firms (which were no longer subject to the requirement of prior notification).
23See Case T-52f96 R, Sogecable v. Commission, [1996] E.C.R. II-797, where the Court noted
that informal comments of the spokesman (confirming a formal Commission decision) were not
reviewable. The wording of the case is however, ambiguous. See J. FAULL, "The Spokesman and
the Law", in European Integration and International Co-ordination - Studies in Transnational
Economic Law in Honour of Glaus-Dieter Ehlermann, Kluwer Law International, 2002 at p. 164.
24 Idem.
25See Case T-25f99, Roberts &: Roberts v. Commission, [2001] E.C.R. II-188!. See also, Case
T-133f95 and T-204f95, IEEG v. Commission, [2001] E.C.R. 1-3875, in which the Court examined
whether speeches delivered by two Commissioners had created legitimate expectations, which
would have been subsequently breached as a result of the adoption of a formal Commission deci-
sion.
190 NICOLAS PETIT AND MIGUEL RATO
efiting individuals), to abide by its pronouncements in subsequent
enforcement initiatives, under pain of being found in breach of gen-
eral principles of EC law.
Furthermore, in Volkswagen AG v. Commission, the CFI consid-
ered that an interview given by Commissioner Van Miert in which
he revealed that Volkswagen would soon be the subj ect of an
infringement decision and incur a large fine constituted a breach of
EC law principles (such as the duty of good administration and the
presumption of innocence). 26 Although this breach was not suffi-
cient for the Court to annul the decision itself (because it would not
have altered the substance of the Commission's findings), 27 the rul-
ing suggests that such violations are capable of giving rise to a right
to claim damages pursuant to Article 288 EC.28
B. - Articles written by Commission officials
Commission officials routinely address issues relating to the
enforcement of EC competition law in articles published in general-
ist 29 and scientific reviews, academic treatises, 30 etc. In contrast
with oral statements - which mainly focus on public policy issues -
written articles typically relate to technical and/or case-specific
issues of EC competition enforcement. Very often, those articles
clarify aspects of the Commission's reasoning underlying particular
investigations and decisions that might otherwise have remained
unknown. They constitute therefore a useful source of guidance for
legal practitioners, who frequently rely upon them to provide
advice to their clients. 31
As noted above, in principle Commission officials write in a per-
sonal capacity. Most competition law scholars and practitioners are
certainly familiar with the archetypal disclaimer that "the views
26 See Case T-62f98, Volkswagen AG v. Commission, [2000] E.C.R. Il-2707.
27 Idem. at §283.
28 Id. at §282 The Court stated: "Moreover, in causing such sensitive aspects of the matters
under deliberation to be disclosed to the press, the Commission acted in a manner injurious to
the interests of good administration at the Community level precisely inasmuch as it enabled the
public at large to have access, during the process of investigation and deliberation, to such infor-
mation, internal to the administration".
29See , for instance, See M. PETITE, "ED Commitment to free competition remains
unchanged", Financial Times, 27 June 2007.
30See, for instance, the competition law treatise edited by J. FAULL and A. NIKPAY, The EC
Law of Competition, Oxford University Press, 2007.
31 See H.A. COSMA and R. WHISH, supra, p. 50.
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expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the official posi-
tion of the European Communities" and that "responsibility for the
information and views expressed lies entirely with the author". As
a result, their written opinions are not an expression of the Com-
mission's enforcement policy and therefore should not limit the
Commission's discretion.
This being said, whilst it is certainly true that articles written by
Commission officials in a personal capacity and published in law
reviews, for example, do not have legal implications for the Com-
mission,32 in our view a different solution presumably applies to
articles that appear in official publications of the Commission. This
is because such official publications, by their very nature and
regardless of the presence of the customary disclaimers, appear to
be endorsed by the institution. For instance, articles published in
the widely disseminated EC Competition Policy Newsletter (pub-
lished by the Commission) may create legitimate expectations for
firms and their counsels. 33
C. - Expert reports and third parties studies
The Commission relies increasingly on reports and studies
authored by third parties. In commissioning such reports, the
Commission typically seeks expert advice that will allow it to
gather data on particular economic sectors or commercial prac-
tices, 34 to determine the feasibility/desirability of proposed policy
reforms,35 to assess the outcome of past enforcement actions in
certain fields/sectors,36 or simply to promote the emergence and
32 Although, in practice, and as noted above they convey indications on the views of Com-
mission officials in respect of certain commercial practices, economic sectors or perhaps more
controversially ongoing investigations.
33The EO competition policy newsletter is published three times a year and is made widely
available on the Internet. See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpn.
34 See Economic impact of regulation in the field of liberal professions in different Member
States, I. PATERSON, M. FINK, A. OGUS et al., Study for the European Commission, DG Compe-
tition, January 2003 available at http://ec.europa.eujcommjcompetitionjpublicationsj
prof_services jexecutive_en.pdf.
35 See Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EO competition
rules, Comparative report prepared by D. WAELBROECK, D. SLATER and G. EVEN-SHOSHAN,
31 August 2004 available at http:j jec.europa.eujcommjcompetitionjantitrustjactionsdamagesj
study.html.
36See, in the field of maritime transport, The application of competition rules to liner shipping,
Final report, Global Insight et al., 26 October 2005, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/com-
petitionjantitrustjothersjmaritimejshippingjeport_26102005.pdf.
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discussion of innovative ideas on intricate issues of EC competition
policy. 37
Those expert reports are generally drafted by third parties
(including law firms, academics and research centres, economic and
business consultancies) and are thus neither binding on the Com-
mission nor amenable to judicial review. 38 They usually contain
the following disclaimer: "The study represents its authors' views
on the subject matter; views which have not been adopted or in
any way approved by the Commission and which should not be
relied upon as a statement of the Commission's or its services
views". 39
In practice, however, several confusing developments in the Com-
mission's practice tend to elevate such expert reports to the rank
of authoritative sources of EC competition policy. First, the reports
are made widely available to the public, being published by the
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities and
posted on the Commission's Internet website.
Second, and more importantly, the terms of reference and ques-
tions defined by the Commission - which delineate the experts'
mandate often conceal a pre-determined enforcement choice. For
instance, in the field of State aid, the Commission regularly seeks
expert advice at advanced stages of its formal investigations to
refine its economic understanding of a case. 40 Similarly, the Com-
mission was arguably already persuaded of the virtues of private
37 See The Economics of Unilateral Effects, M. IVALDI, B. JULLIEN, P. REY, P. SEABRIGHT,
J. TIROLE, IDEI, Toulouse November 2003, Interim Report for DG Competition, European Com-
mission, available at http:j jec.europa.eujcommjcompetitionjmergersjstudies_reports j
the_economics_oCunilateral_effects_en.pdf; Information Exchange among Firms and their Impact
on Oompetition, Office for Official Publications of the European Community, Luxemburg, 1995,
K.U. KtrHN and X. VIVES; New Industrial Economics and Experiences from European Merger
Oontrol - New lessons about collective dominance 1, Study commissioned by the European Com-
mission, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxemburg, 1995,
E. KANTZENBACH, E. KOTTMANN and R. KRUGER; Minority Share Acquisition: The Impact upon
Oompetition, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxemburg, 1986, S.
MEADOWCROFT and D. THOMPSON.
38 Pursuant to Article 230 EC, only acts that emanate from European institutions can be chal-
lenged through annulment proceedings before the European courts.
39 In addition, it is often provided that: "The European Commission does not guarantee the
accuracy of the data included in the report, nor does it accept responsibility for any use made
thereof".
40 See COMPj2008jF3j003: Appel d'offres relatif a la realisation d'une etude sur la garantie
illimitee de la Republique frangaise a La Poste; COMPj2008jF3jOOI : Study to benchmark the
cost and profit accounting of certain services provided by Deutsche Post AG (DPAG).
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enforcement of EC competition law when it commissioned the
extensive Ashurst Study. 41
Third, with the emergence of new institutional models, the divid-
ing line between third-party expert reports and the Commission's
own views on EC competition law enforcement is becoming increas-
ingly blurred,. The Commission has recently, created sui generis
organs with permanent advisory duties to which high-profile
experts have been appointed. For instance, it created in 2003 the
Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy ("EAGCP"), a
discussion forum comprising prominent economists directly
appointed by the Competition Commissioner 42 whose role is to
"support DG Competition in improving the economic reasoning in
competition policy analysis" and to deliver opinions on "issues of
topical interest". 43
In sum, the Commission's appropriation, in practice, of third-
party reports may create an optical illusion as to their role as well
as to the relevance of the policy orientations and legal interpreta-
tions contained therein. This also has the potential to exert a sig-
nificant influence on firms' conduct (and counsels giving legal
advice).
D. - Press releases
The Commission usually issues press releases following the adop-
tion of a formal decision under Articles 81 and 82 EC or the ECMR
(e.g. decisions finding an infringement and imposing fines, commit-
41 See N. KROES, SPEECHj05j533 of 22 September 2005, Enhancing Actions for Damages for
Breach of Competition Rules in Europe, Dinner Speech at the Harvard Club New York, 22nd Sep-
tember 2005 : "Our debate in Europe is of rather a different nature. It is not about reducing the
excesses of damages actions, not because there aren't any excesses, but simply because we hardly
have any actions for damages at all. The recent Ashurst study found that this form of private
action is totally underdeveloped in Europe. That is why the Commission - as I said, convinced
by the potential benefits of encouraging private enforcement of the competition rules - wants to stim-
ulate public debate in Europe on this topic (emphasis added)".
42 Upon proposal of the Chief competition economist. See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/
economistjeagcp.html.
43 The EAGCP has inter alia issued opinions on "Non-horizontal merger guidelines" and
on the "Economic approach to Article 82 EC". See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/econ-
omistjeagcp.html. Within the framework of the EAGCP, three sub-groups have been set up
to work on issues related to anti-trust, mergers and state aid. The advisory groups meet 3-
4 times a year in Brussels. Each of these meetings is a full day brainstorming session with
typically one Core competition policy issue being discussed. Each sub-group presents an
"opinion" on a topic commissioned by the Chief Economist, the Director-General or the
Commissioner.
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ment decisions, decisions imposing remedies, etc.). 44 In addition, it
occasionally adopts press releases to comment on or clarify certain
developments in EC and national competition laws (often in the
form of "Memos" or "Frequently Asked Questions"). 45
In recent years, the Commission's practice of issuing press
releases has witnessed a dual evolution which, in our view, displays
some features of sunshine enforcement. First, the number of press
releases adopted by the Commission - in particular in the field of
Articles 81 and 82 EC ("PR-AT") has steadily increased, as evi-
denced in the table below. 46
44 In particular, in respect of Decisions adopted pursuant to Articles 7 to 10 of Council Reg-
ulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down
in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, (2003) O.J. L 1/1. See also, C. KERSE and N. KHAN, EC Anti-
trust Procedure, 5th ed., Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 2005; L. ORTIZ BLANCO, EC Competition Pro-
cedure, 5th Ed., Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2005 at §6-050. The Commission's press
releases (and other written information disclosed to the press) are issued by its Directorate-Gen-
eral for Press and Communication. This department is under the authority of the President of
the Commission and is headed by a Director General and by the Spokesperson. The Spokesperson
is assisted by more than twenty spokespersons responsible for specific portfolios, among which
competition policy. See J. FAULL, supra, p. 160.
45The Commission increasingly adopts press releases to comment on judgments handed down
by the Community courts (such press releases are common in the context of judgments under
Article 234 EC) and on measures adopted by other bodies (EC legislation, decisions of NCAs,
etc.). For instance, following the CFI's ruling in Tetra Laval, the Commission publicly expressed
its disagreement with the standard of judicial review endorsed by the Court. See Commission
Press Release, Commission appeals CFI ruling on Tetra Laval/Sidel to the European Court of
Justice, IP/02/1952 of 20 December 2002. See, more generally, L. ORTIZ BLANCO, supra, §4.33.
Press releases labelled "Memos" generally seek to clarify legal issues arising fro~ certain cases
(the Commission usually issues Memos in the context of settlements when it does not adopt a
final decision). Memos describe briefly the facts of the case and the legal approach followed by
the Commission, and sometimes provide answers to FAQs. During the British Airways proceed-
ings, the Commission explained that its press releases are an important source of guidance for
firms, as they convey its stance on certain practices. See Case T-219/99, British Airways pic v.
Commission, [2003] E.C.R. II-5917 at §62 ("According to the press release on the principles con-
cerning travel agents' commissions, issued on the same day that the contested decision was
adopted, that decision constituted a first step in dealing with commissions paid by airlines to
travel agents. The principles established in that press release also gave clear guidance for any
other airline in a situation similar to that of BA, and the Commission stated that it would take
all measures necessary to ensure that those principles were complied with by other airlines in
equivalent situations"). In the Austrian banks cartel case, the CFI noted that the Commission,
through the adoption of a press release, had clarified the state of the law with respect to agree-
ments on bank interest rates. The Court accordingly rejected the allegation that the Commission
had been ambiguous and had created legal uncertainty. See Cases T-259/02 to T-264/02 and T-
271/02, Raijjeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG and others v. Commission, [2006] E.C.R. II-5169 at
§507.
46 Authors' calculation based on the press releases available on the Commission's Internet
website.
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TABLE I
Number of press releases issued by the Commission
(antitrust and mergers)
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995(Jan-May)
PR-AT 38 101 99 77 65 75 58 79 55 41 45 28 25 34
PR- 60 193 169 150 85 78 82 103 130 139 95 82 34 59
ECMR
Second, the Commission issues a growing number of press releases
in mere procedural matters wholly unrelated to substantive legal
issues. 47 The objectives pursued by the Commission in so doing are
less clear. It may be the case that it simply seeks to inform the pub-
lic. It may also be the case that such press releases pursue ulterior
"sunshine" enforcement goals. For instance, the Commission may
publish a press release related to an ongoing investigation with a
view to inciting parties who may hold information of significance to
the case to come forward (i.e. an information gathering purpose). 48
In addition, merely by bringing to the fore the fact that a firm is
under investigation, such press releases can create the impression
that the Commission has already reached a finding as to the exist-
ence of an infringement, and may induce that firm to modify its
behaviour (i.e. a compliance inducement purpose). 49
Despite a paucity of relevant judicial precedent, the question
whether a press release may contain an indication of the Commis-
sion's likely conduct when assessing future cases - and thereby
restrict its enforcement discretion appears to be settled. In Roberts
and Roberts v. Oommission, the Court examined whether a press
release issued by the Commission had created legitimate expecta-
tions for the applicants challenging a subsequent Commission deci-
sion. 5o After reviewing the content of the press release, the Court
found that it had not created such expectations because the legal
standard described in it - which the applicants claimed should have
been applied in their case did not apply to the relevant facts. This
47See C. KEESE and N. KHAN, supra at §6-050.
.1\ 48See C. KEESE and N. KHAN, supra at §6-050.
49The Commission may for instance inform the public that it has taken the decision to open
formal proceedings against a specific firm which it suspects of infringement of the competition
rules, without, however, having a sufficiently strong case to adopt, at that stage, a Statement
of Objections.
50 See Case T-25f99, Roberts and Roberts v. Commission, supra at §§124 and 130.
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being said, the fact that the Court examined whether the challenged
decision was consistent with the orientations contained in the press
release strongly suggests that such press releases can have a binding
effect on the Commission and as a result limit its discretion in
enforcing EC competition law. 51
E. - Oommission papers
(discussion papers, non-papers, etc.)
Driven to a large extent by DG Competition, a new breed of
"papers" dealing with specific legal issues (and/or economic sectors)
has mushroomed in EC competition enforcement. Despite their het-
erogeneous nomenclature (discussion papers, non-papers, position
papers, consultation papers, working papers, etc.), those papers
share at least three common features. First, they are authored by
services within DG Competition (generally, units or directorates),
and as such are not necessarily reviewed by other Commission serv-
ices (the legal service, for instance),52 or by the Commissioners. 53
5l.0ther cases in which the applicants relied on a Commission press release either concerned
different legal issues (such as whether a press release constitutes evidence) or did not result in
a ruling on the substance. In General Electric v. Commission, for instance, the applicant sought
to demonstrate that two press releases reporting an interview with the Competition Com-
missioner had given rise to the "legitimate expectation" that the Commission would clear a
merger transaction in exchange for stronger remedies offered by the merging parties. The Court
however dismissed the argument on procedural grounds. See Case T-21O/01, General electric v.
Commission, [2005] E.C.R. II-5575 at §53. In T ACA, the applicants relied on a Commission press
release (as well as on various "articles") as a source of evidence. It was alleged that the press
release provided evidence that the Commission had - unlawfully - enforced Article 82 EC to
bypass the legislative immunity enjoyed by liner conferences under Article 81 EC. The Court
however refused to hold that the alleged circumvention of Article 81 EC was a breach of EC com-
petition law. See Cases T-191/98 and T-212/98 to T-214/98, Atlantic Container Line AB and oth-
ers v. Commission, [2003] E.C.R. II-3275 at §§453 and following. Finally, in Royal Philips Elec-
tronics NV v. Commission, the CFI held that the adoption of a press release would have given
rise to a "duty to state reasons" pursuant to Article 253 EC only if it had contained "a decision
which can be the subject of an application for annulment under Article 230 EC". Accordingly,
press releases may encapsulate legal decisions having adverse effects on third parties (a referral
decision under Article 9 of the ECMR, for instance). See Case, T-1l9/02, Royal Philips Electronics
NV v. Commission, [2003] E.C.R. II-1433 at §392.
52This arguably explains why, for instance, in the DG Competition Paper Concerning Issues
of Competition in Waste Management, it is explicitly acknowledged that "the views expressed
in the present document are purely those of the Directorate General for Competition at the time
of writing".
53This explains why they are often labeled "Staff papers". In addition the authors of these
papers are not necessarily identified. Most of the time, the papers simply mention "Commission
services documents". See, for instance, Consultation paper on the review of Council Regulation
4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty to mar-
itime transport. Note, however, that the author of the paper is often indirectly identifiable as
the addressee of the replies to the consultation process.
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Second, such papers are generally adopted in the context of the
"review" of specific enforcement policies (such as, for instance, the
so-called "Article 82 EC review", which seeks to increase the role of
economic analysis in abuse of dominance cases). 54 They are there-
fore, by their very nature, acts with a provisional status, setting
out DG Competition's preliminary views on certain practice(s)jsec-
tor(s) and, in certain circumstances, posing questions to stakehold-
ers. 55 Third, these papers are general in scope, and do not target
individual market players.
In contrast with so-called "Green papers" and "White papers",
which are formally adopted by the Commission and normally cul-
minate in legislative action,56 this other type of Commission paper
is not necessarily followed-up by immediate, subsequent, action (e.g.
adoption of guidelines, decisions, etc.). For instance, the Merger
Remedies Study and,57 perhaps more importantly, the Discussion
Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusion-
ary Abuses remain in a state of administrative limbo, more than 2
years after their release.
Despite their lesser status, these heterogeneous papers may serve
to better define the boundaries of anticompetitive behaviour, as
well as the legal standards applicable. In addition, the wide consul-
tation and discussion process that usually follows their publication
can be expected to shed light on the legal issues addressed and
make market players more sensitive to the potentially anticompet-
itive nature of certain business practices. 58
54 See Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses,
Brussels, December 2005, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/
discpaper2005.pdf. They may also follow expert reports issued by third parties. See, for instance,
Consultation paper on the review of Council Regulation 4056f86 laying down detailed rules for
the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty to maritime transport, 27 March 2003, avail-
able at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/anti trustflegislationfmaritimefen.pdf.
55 See Consultation paper on the review of Council Regulation 4056f86 laying down detailed
rules for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty to maritime transport, supra.
56 They usually give rise to a legislative proposal from the Commission to the Council (and
possibly the Parliament).
57In October 2005, the Commission issued a self-evaluation document reviewing its policy on
merger remedies (its goal was also to determine whether (and where) further improvements were
needed). The study followed a process of consultation of firms involved in merger transactions
having led to the adoption of remedies. See DG COMP In-House Merger Remedies Study, Octo-
ber 2005 available at http: ffec.europa.eufcommfcompetitionfmergersfstudies_reports f
remedies_study.pdf.
58 See F. WIJCKMANS, F. TUYTSCHAEVER and A. VANDERELST, Vertical Agreements in EO
Oompetition Law, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 40-41.
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As regards their legal status, it should be noted that the
papers' authors always seek to shelter the Commission from sub-
sequent legal consequences stemming from their content. For
instance, in addition to the usual disclaimer that it "may not, in
any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of
the European Commission", the Discussion Paper on Article 82
EC bluntly states that it "has no enforcement status". 59 In other
words, the Commission wishes to remain free to deviate from the
legal standards contained in its papers in the course of its
enforcement activities. This caution is understandable: papers
are provisional documents intended to stimulate debate, and
should not fetter the Commission's discretion in subsequent
enforcement action (for instance, through the creation of legiti-
mate expectations).
To date, the Community courts have not ruled on the legal
effects of this type of document. 60 In our experience, although the
expectations they create may not rise to a level warranting legal
protection, it is undeniable that, in practice, such discussion papers,
non-papers and the like have a profound influence on the daily
work of legal practitioners. This is all the more so in the - not so
uncommon - instances where the state of the law is unclear or in a
state of flux (e.g. the legal standards applicable to rebates granted
by dominant firms).
F. - Annual reports on competition policy
Since 1971, the Commission has published an Annual Report on
Competition Policy (the "annual report") 61 providing an Qverview
of the main developments in EC competition policy and summariz-
ing changes to EC competition rules that have occurred over the
59 See Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses,
supra at p. 1.
60 In British Airways v. Commission, Advocate General Kokott recalled that the Commission's
Discussion Paper on Article 82 EC was bound to comply with the case-law of the Court of Justice
(see Case C-95/04 P, Opinion of AG V. KOKOTT, British Airways pic vs Commission, [2007] E.C.R.
1-2331 at §28). In Cementbouw Handel &> Industrie BV, the CFI declined to enter into the debate
over the interpretation of the Green Paper on the review of Regulation 4064/89. See Case T-282/
02, Cementbouw Handel &> Industrie v. Commission [2006] E.C.R. II-319. In Case T-312/02, Meca-
Medina and Majcen v. Commission, [2004] E.C.R. II-3291, at §§46-47, the Court found support
in a Commission working paper to conclude that rules regulating doping fell outside the purview
of the economic activities covered by Articles 81 and 82 EC.
61 The annual report on Competition Policy is published by the Commission in response to a
request of the European Parliament contained in a resolution of 7 June 1971.
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course of the previous year. 62 The annual report is adopted by the
Commission as a whole, in the form of an official "Communication".
It is usually preceded by a foreword from the Competition Commis-
sioner. 63
Importantly, annual reports show, through selected examples,
how the EC competition rules are implemented. In addition, they
are often supplemented by various sets of annexes (in the form of
Staff working papers), which provide detailed case-specific informa-
tion, methodological information, statistics, etc. Again, annual
reports constitute a useful tool to instigate voluntary compliance
with the law.
Whilst they are characterized by their strong policy-making con-
tent, annual reports are nonetheless capable of having legal effects.
By virtue of their general scope, normative statements made in the
context of annual reports have been judged by the Court as capable
of having binding effects on the Commission. In the notorious Her-
cules v. Commission case (Polypropylene), the applicant alleged that
a Commission decision applying Article 81 EC was not adequately
reasoned, and thus infringed Article 253 EC (ex Article 190 EC).64
In particular, the applicant argued that in adopting an infringe-
ment decision, the Commission must take account of the opinion of
the hearing officer, even though it is not obliged to follow it. By
failing to mention that the hearing officer had delivered his opinion,
the Commission decision in question would have been inadequately
reasoned. The applicant based its claim on the "decision taken by
the Commission to institute the position of the hearing office and
from the hearing officer's terms of reference", which had been
appended to the Thirteenth report on competition policy. The
Court cautiously avoided having to determine whether the hearing
officer's terms of reference contained in the Report constituted a
decision amenable to judicial review under Article 230 EC. How-
ever, the Court went on to consider whether the Commission had
followed the procedure pertaining to the hearing officer's interven-
tion as provided in the document annexed to the annual report and
found that the Commission had not breached any fundamental
62 The annual report is now published in conjunction with the General Report on the activities
of the European Union.
63See, for instance, Report on Competition Policy 2006,2006 COM(2007)358 final.
64Case T-7f89, SA Hercules Chemicals NV v. Commission, [1991] ECR 11-711.
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requirement contained therein (the Court held that according to the
terms of reference, the hearing officer's report is not, for the pur-
poses of Article 190 EC, an opinion which the Commission is
required to obtain when taking an infringement decision). In so
doing, the Court confirmed that, in a fashion similar to the obliga-
tions that may stem from oral statements and press releases, the
Commission must abide by the rules it imposes on itself, under pain
of breaching the principle of legal certainty. 65
G. - Sector inquiries
Pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission can
launch "investigations into sectors of the economy and into types
of agreements". These wide-ranging investigations are usually
referred to as sector inquiries. And the Commission is likely to
launch them in particular where "the trend of trade between Mem-
ber States, the rigidity of prices or other circumstances suggest that
competition may be restricted or distorted within the common mar-
ket" .66 In contrast with traditional investigations, the Commission
does not need to rely on other reasons (such as a suspicion that
anticompetitive conduct has occurred) when it decides to open a
sector inquiry. 67 Yet, it holds similar powers and, in particular, the
ability to send requests for information to firms and to carry out
inspections of business premises. 68
Importantly, the purpose of sector inquiries is not necessarily to
trigger formal enforcement actions. Rather, Article 17 of Regula-
tion 1/2003 provides that the Commission may "publish a report on
the results of its inquiry into particular sectors of the economy or
particular types of agreements across various sectors and invite
comments from interested parties". In practice, only a fraction of
all sector inquiries carried out to date (i.e. in the energy sector, 69
65 See also, for a similar interpretation, Case T-528/93, M etropole Television v. Commission,
[1996] E.C.R. II-649 at §169: "In that case the Commission had in fact made known, through
its annual report on competition policy, a number of rules which it had imposed on itself relating
to access to the file in competition proceedings".
66 See Article 17(1) of Regulation 1/2003, supra.
67 See L. ORTIZ BLANCO, supra, §5.04.
68 See Articles 18 and 20 of Regulation 1/2003, supra.
69 See, on this, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/index.html.
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financial services, 70 local loop,71 leased lines, 72 roaming,73 3G
media content 74) have led to formal enforcement action. In most
cases, the Commission has published a detailed report identifying
instances of market failures as well as raising questions on the exist-
ence of anticompetitive business behaviour in the sector investi-
gated.
In the same way as traditional sunshine enforcement, the mere
initiation of sector inquiries has allowed the Commission to bring
about significant changes in firms' conduct. For instance, following
the initiation of the so-called "leased line investigation'" a number
of telecoms operators decided to slash the prices of their services
immediately. 75 Similarly, in the context of an informal sector
inquiry relating to CD pricing in Germany, the music majors aban-
doned the practice of publishing minimum list prices.
In addition, the final report may cast light on potentially suspi-
cious commercial practices or simply conclude that one or several
firms active in the sector under investigation wield significant mar-
ket power. This disclosure, coupled with the threat of follow-on
enforcement actions (by competition authorities and courts), 76 leg-
islative intervention, 77 or public opprobrium, 78 may in and of itself
induce changes in the conduct of firms active in the economic sector









75 See D. CHOUMELOVA and J. DELGADO, "Monitoring Competition in the Telecommunications
Sector: European Commission Sector Inquiries", in P.A. BUIGUES and P. REY (Eds), The Eco-
nomics of Antitrus! and Regulation in Telecommunications, Edward ELGAR, Cheltentham, 2004 at
pp.273-275.
76 See D. WOOD and N. BAVEREZ, "Sector Inquiries under ED Competition Law", Competition
Law Insight, at p. 4.
77 In the context of its energy sector inquiry, the Commission has made reference to possible
changes to the European regulatory framework for energy markets.
78 In the context of its energy sector inquiry, the Commission clearly insisted, in its Final
Report, on the fact that consumers and businesses were being harmed by inefficient and expen-
sive gas and electricity markets. See, for a summary of these findings, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
competitionjsectorsjenergyjinquiryjindex.html.
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H. - Formal Commission Guidelines,
Notices and Communications
Over the past fifteen years, the Commission has issued an increas-
ing number of Guidelines, Communications and Notices. 79 These
instruments are adopted by the Commission as a whole and pub-
lished in the Official Journal of the European Union ("Or). Exam-
ples of such Communications include the Guidelines on vertical
restraints, the Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 to hori-
zontal co-operation agreements, the Commission Notice on the def-
inition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community com-
petition law, the Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal
mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentra-
tions between undertakings. 80
Put simply, the main purpose of these formal instruments is to
provide assistance to firms, 81 competitions authorities and national
courts,82 when engaging in complex competitive assessment. 83 They
79See D. GERADIN and N. PETIT, "Judicial Remedies under EC Competition Law: Complex
Issues arising from the 'Modernisation' Process", (2005) Fordham International Law Journal, pp.393-
439. There is no significant difference between these instruments, which seem to be interchangeable
(see, on this, H.A. COSMA and R. WmsH, supra at p. 51). In a nutshell, the proliferation of such
guidelines, notices and communications is due to the recognition that economic operators need added
guidance in light of (i) the requirement, introduced by the adoption of Regulation 1/2003, that firms
themselves assess the legality of their business practices and (ii) the increased sophistication of sub-
stantive EC competition law resulting in part from the influence of micro-economic analysis.
80 Although the Commission's website exhibits most notices, the Commission does not publish
a full list of all those in force. However, a list of such notices has been published as an Annex
to the Notice on co-operation between the Commission and National Courts. See Commission
Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the ED Member States in
the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ C 101/54 of 27 April 2004. There are doubts as to
whether this list is exhaustive given that a number of notices are not mentioned (sub-contract-
ing, exclusive commercial agents, etc.). It has been suggested that the omitted instruments
should now be presumed defunct. See C. COOK and N. KHAN, supra at §1-026. For a full list, see
VAN BAEL and BELLIS, Competition Law of the European Community, 4th Ed., Kluwer Law
International, The Hague, 2005, at pp. 1146-1148.
81See Commission Notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C 291/1 of 13 October 2000,
at §3: "By issuing these Guidelines the Commission aims to help companies to make their own
assessment of vertical agreements under the EC competition rules".
82 See Commission Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the ED
Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, supra at §8: "National courts may find
guidance in Commission regulations and decisions which present elements that are similar to those
in a case they are dealing with, as well as in Commission notices and guidelines relating to the
application of Articles 81 and 82 EC and in the annual report on competition policy".
83To that end, they set out the views of the Commission (i.e. its interpretation of statutory
and case law). In addition, the Commission often builds on the case-law of the EC Courts, where
existing precedent is unclear or where it does not fully answer a specific question. See for
instance, Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably
restrict competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (de
minimis), OJ C 368/13 of 22 December 2001.
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thus pursue enforcement-related goals, i.e. they aim to induce firms
to comply with EC competition law and to assist courts and com-
petition authorities in applying it.
In addition, in our view, those Communications addressing sub-
stantive issues of competition law may also represent a form of sun-
shine enforcement. 84 In the decentralized enforcement system insti-
tuted by Regulation 1/2003 (and a fortiori within the realm of the
private enforcement of competition law), competitors, suppliers,
customers and governments playa key role in the detection of com-
petition law infringements. It can be argued that the Guidelines,
Notices and Communications adopted by the Commission increase
the likelihood that those dealing with infringers' will be able to
detect anticompetitive behaviour, and attempt to bring it to an
end.
In that respect, the Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3)
of the Treaty are a case in point. Despite their title - which sug-
gests that they focus solely on the interpretation of the exception
provided in Article 81(3) EC - the Guidelines deal at length with
substantive issues underlying "the prohibition rule of Article 81( 1)
EC".85 Similarly, the Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81
to horizontal co-operation agreements devote considerable space to
categories - and examples - of unlawful agreements and practices,
under the heading "assessment under Article 81(1)".86
From a purely legal standpoint, the most interesting issue raised
by these Communications, Notices and Guidelines is perhaps
whether they have a binding effect on the Commission. 87 Generally
s4Most of these instruments concern substantive issues of EC competition law. More recently,
the Commission has adopted such instruments with respect to procedural matters. See C. COOK
and N. KHAN, supra at §1-026.
S5 See L. IDOT, "La qualification de la restriction de concurrence: a p'ropos des lignes direc-
trices de la Commission concernant l'application de l'article 81, §3", in La Modernisation du droit
de la concurrence (G. CANIVET), LGDJ, Paris, 2006 at p. 88.
s6The Guidelines on Vertical Restraints contain similar provisions, under the heading "nega-
tive effects of vertical restraints». Commission notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, supra
at §103-114.
87 By contrast, the related issue of whether these instruments are amenable to judicial review
appears less significant. In France v. Commission, the ECJ held that a Commission Notice which
aimed at formally interpreting a directive but which surreptitiously introduced new legal obli-
gations could be the subject of an annulment action. See Case C-325/91, France v. Commission,
[1993] E.C.R. 1-3283. This being said, one may argue that challenging illegal guidelines through
annulment proceedings is a trivial issue in practice. Guidelines are in themselves incapable of
having direct adverse legal effects on firms (unless they are decisions in disguise). Only decisions
enforcing Article 81 and 82 EC may have such effect. And, in such cases, the addressee of the
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speaking, the likelihood that they will significantly constrain the
Commission in an individual case is limited by the fact that such
instruments are general in nature. The Commission may thus find
an infringement in circumstances where an assessment under the
Notice would seem to imply that no such infringement can be
established. 88
This being said, the Court has recognized that Guidelines, Com-
munications and Notices can constrain the Commission's enforce-
ment discretion through a form of "Estoppel". 89 This principle is
encapsulated in the judgment handed down in Dansk Rerindustri
and others v. Commission:
"The Court has already held, in a judgment concerning internal measures
adopted by the administration, that although those measures may not be
regarded as rules of law which the administration is always bound to observe,
they nevertheless form rules of practice from which the administration may not
depart in an individual case without giving reasons that are compatible with
the principle of equal treatment. Such measures therefore constitute a general
act and the officials and other staff concerned may invoke their illegality in
support of an action against the individual measures taken on the basis of the
measures (see Case C-171/00, P Liberos v Commission, [2002] ECR 1-451, par-
agraph 35).
decision can challenge that act directly before the CFI and, during the proceedings, call into
question the validity of the guidelines. At any rate, there are doubts that firms can, in the cur-
rent state of EC law, bring annulment actions against acts of a general nature, such as guidelines.
In accordance with established case-law, individual applicants are unlikely to be affected "indi-
vidually" by an act of a general nature that is not addressed to specific parties. This means that
only privileged applicants (i.e. Member States and ED institutions) have legal standing to bring
annulment proceedings against such general measures. This state of affairs is open to criticism
for several reasons. First, putting aside State aid law, Notices adopted in the field of competition
law are exclusively addressed to economic operators whose behaviour is covered by Articles 81
and 82 EC or by the ECMR. The likelihood that Member States or other ED institutions would
appeal the adoption of these acts is therefore low. Consequently, there is a risk that these notices
would be, de facto, shielded from legal review by the Community Courts with the attendant risk
that the Commission could seek to take advantage of this vacuum to deliberately extend its pow-
ers.
88See M. CINl, "The soft law approach: Commission rule-making in the ED's state aid
regime", Journal of European Public Policy, 8 :2,2001, pp. 201-202.
89 Put simply the Estoppel principle prevents a person from asserting or denying something
in court that contradicts what has already been established as the truth. In the past, the Court
followed a cautious approach when called to rule on the legal value of Communications. In the
Sugar case, for instance, the Court accepted a claim that a particular infringement did not war-
rant a fine because the notice on commercial agents had created the impression that the conduct
in question was not prohibited. See Cases 40/48, 50, 54/56, Ill, 113 and 114/7, Cooperatieve
Vereniging "Suiker Unie" UA and others v. Commission, [1975] E.C.R. 1663. In the Hercules
case, supra, the Court considered that the Commission was bound by it pronouncements on
access to the file. In Case C-251/98, Spain v. Commission, [2002] E.C.R, 1-8031, the ECJ consid-
ered that the Commission was bound by its Communications on the interaction between the
Commission and the Members States. For a more restrictive approach, see Metropole Television,
supra.
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That case-law applies a fortiori to rules of conduct designed to produce
external effects, as is the case of the Guidelines, which are aimed at traders.
In adopting such rules of conduct and announcing by publishing them that
they will henceforth apply to the cases to which they relate, the institution in ques-
tion imposes a limit on the exercise of its discretion and cannot depart from those
rules under pain of being found, where appropriate, to be in breach of the general
principles of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expecta-
tions. It cannot therefore be precluded that, on certain conditions and depend-
ing on their content, such rules of conduct, which are of general application,
may produce legal effects (emphasis added). 90
Therefore, just as is the case with oral statements and press
releases, a Commission decision that departs from principles or legal
interpretations contained in existing Guidelines, Communications
and Notices can be challenged on the grounds that it infringes gen-
eral principles of EC law, such as the duty of good administration,
protection of legitimate expectations or legal certainty. 91
1. - Guidance letters
Recital 38 of the preamble to Regulation 1/2003 allows compa-
nies to seek the informal view of the Commission where the appli-
cation of Article 81 or 82 EC to a given practice is uncertain (e.g.
because the legal standard is unclear) or raises novel questions. 92
The Commission has specified in its "Notice on informal guidance
relating to novel questions" the circumstances in which it would
provide such guidance. 93
Guidance letters have the potential to become a prime example
of "sunshine" enforcement. They are aimed at a vast audience (the
Notice states that "Guidance letters will be posted on the Commis-
sion's website"), and thus may be an effective tool to promote vol-
untary compliance with competition law and uncover types of anti-
competitive behaviour that were hitherto not evident. 94
90See Case, C-189/02 P, Dansk R0rindustri and others v. Commission, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5425, at
§§209-211.
91 It would be perhaps more advisable, as a matter of judicial policy, to clearly recognize that
the principles of Estoppel or "patere legem quam ipse jecisti" are general principles of EC law,
92 This possibility was in fact created in response to concerns that, with the abolition of the
requirement to notify agreements brought about by Regulation 1/2003, undertakings would no
longer be able to clarify their legal position by subjecting a given agreement to Commission
examination.
93See Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel questions concerning
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that arise in individual cases (guidance letters), OJ C 101/
78 of 27 April 2004.
94 Idem at §21.
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Despite this potential, four years after their introduction, Guid-
ance letters remain shrouded in mystery. Rather surprisingly, the
Commission has never used them. If the role of such guidance let-
ters is to clarify obscure or novel issues of competition law, it can
perhaps be argued that the Commission is reluctant to crystallize a
solution - that will bind it in the future 95 - in cases where a trial
and error approach (through individual decisions) would be more
advisable.
J. - Inapplicability decisions
Article 10 of Regulation 1/2003 allows the Commission to adopt
ex officio decisions finding that Articles 81 and 82 are not applicable
to certain practices. 96 Such inapplicability decisions adopted under
Article 10 do not, strictly speaking, represent the enforcement of
Articles 81 or 82 EC. This being said, we believe that Article 10
decisions constitute indirect enforcement decisions in so far as they
define the boundary between lawful and unlawful behaviour.
Inapplicability decisions could prove useful "sunshine" regulation
instruments (i.e. they can ensure voluntary compliance with EC
competition law) as suggested by the language of Regulation 1/2003
itself, which provides that such decisions are "declaratory" in
nature. 97
Nevertheless, the Commission is yet to adopt its first inapplica-
bility decision. Just as is the case with Guidance letters, the reasons
for its unwillingness to do so are unclear. Perhaps, as noted above,
it is due to a fear that they may limit not only the Commission's
margin of discretion but also that of other competition authorities
in formal enforcement cases. 98
95 Pursuant to the principles established by the ECJ in Dansk RfJrindustri and others v. Com-
mission, supra the Commission is arguably obliged to conform to orientations contained in its
guidance letters when carrying out subsequent enforcement activities.
96 Unlike Guidance letters which are requested by undertakings themselves.
97 An act is regarded as "constitutive" when it modifies a legal situation. An act is considered
as "declaratory" when it simply acknowledges a legal or factual situation. See G. CORNU, Vocab-
ulaire Juridique, PUF, 3rd Ed., 2000.
98 Findings of inapplicability are binding on national competition authorities and national
courts in so far as Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003, which prohibits these bodies from taking deci-
sions that conflict with the Commission's interpretation of EC law, also appears to cover these
types of decisions. See Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003, supra.
..~
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III. - THE VIRTUES
OF SUNSHINE ENFORCEMENT INSTRUMENTS
A. - Providing guidance
In the debates preceding the adoption of Regulation 1/2003,
many scholars and practitioners expressed fears that the abolition
of the system of mandatory notification of agreements to the Com-
mission would deprive firms of a significant source of guidance, rep-
resented by comfort letters and Article 81(3) EC decisions. 99
It can be argued that the Commission's increasing reliance on the
wide array of sunshine regulation instruments described in the pre-
vious sections has contributed to dispelling many of those concerns.
These instruments have indeed provided useful guidance on sub-
stantive aspects of EC competition law to firms facing the intrica-
cies inherent in the competitive assessment of their own behaviour.
For instance, our experience suggests that the Discussion paper on
Article 82 EC has proved invaluable in helping firms with signifi-
cant market power and their advisors devise business strategies
compliant with EC competition law in fields where the applicable
legal standard is far from clear (such as rebates and tying).
In addition, due to the time required to expunge confidential
information from formal infringement decisions - and very often
to translate them - a number of years often passes between the
date of adoption of such decisions and their publication in the OJ.
In many instances, the Commission can compensate for these
shortcomings by issuing detailed press releases or by summarizing
the most salient aspects of its decisions in a variety of instruments
(e.g. articles, annual reports on competition policy, etc.). By
resorting to such sunshine instruments the Commission is able to
clarify its interpretation of EC competition law in a timely fash-
ion.
99 See e.g. F. MONTAG and T. JANSSENS, "Article 81(3) in the context of modernisation a law-
yer's view", in D. GERADIN (Ed.), Modernisation and enlargement: two major challenges for EC
competition law, Intersentia: Antwerp, Oxford, 2004; H. BOURGEOIS, "The impact of moderni-
zation on companies and their counsels", in D. GERADIN (Ed.), ibid.; V. POWER, "Representing
clients after the modernisation of EC competition law", (2003) l.C.C.L.R. 335; H.M. GILLIAMS,
"Modernisation: from policy to practice", (2003) 28 European Law Review, 451.
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B. - Improving detection of anticompetitive behaviour
By increasing the awareness and understanding of the role of EC
competition law, "sunshine" enforcement instruments playa key
role in the detection of anticompetitive conduct. 100 Although those
effects are difficult to quantify, it is likely that the multiplication
of public pronouncements on various competition law topics has
allowed private economic actors to identify specific instances of
anticompetitive conduct and take action against them before such
infringements are detected by competition authorities.
For instance, one can speculate about the extent to which the
flurry of press releases, speeches, statements and articles that fol-
lowed the Commission's 2004 Microsoft decision,101 contributed to
the recrudescence of complaints alleging abuses in other markets
not only against Microsoft, but also against other large firms active
in dynamic markets. 102
C. - Reducing the Commission's administrative burden
The Commission has often stated that it has limited administra-
tive resources to deal with the workload imposed by its ever-
increasing attributions. The adoption of Regulation 1/2003 repre-
sented the most far reaching attempt to alleviate that burden and
100See G.S. BECKER, "A theory of competition among pressure groups and political influ-
ence", (1983) The Quarterly Journal Of Economics, Vol. 98, pp. 371-400.
101 See the 24 Commission Press Releases published on the European Union website from
10 February 2000 to 27 February 2008, at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/
indexfby_nr_75.html. See, also, N. KROES, Press conference on imposing penalty paYl"ents on
Microsoft - introductory remarks, European Commission, Brussels, 12th July 2006; N. KROES,
Introductory remarks on CFI ruling on Microsoft's abuse of dominant market position, Press con-
ference, Brussels, 17th September 2007; N. KROE'S, Introductory remarks on Microsoft's compliance
with March 2004 antitrust decision, Press conference, Brussels, 22nd October 2007; N. KROES,
Decision to impose € 899 million penalty on Microsoft for non-compliance, Introductory remarks
at press conference, Brussels, 27th February 2008. See e.g. N. BANAsEvIC, J. HUBY, M. PENA CAS-
TELLOT, O. SITAR and H. PIFFAUT, Commission adopts Decision in the Microsoft case, EC Com-
petition Policy Newsletter, 2004, 2, pp. 44-48; C. MADERO, N. BANASEVIC, C. HERMES, J. HUBY
and T. KRAMLER, The Court of First Instance rejects Microsoft's request for interim measures
concerning the Commission's decision of 24 March 2004, EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 2005,
1, pp. 53-58; N. BANAsEvIC, A. BARBERA DEL ROSAL, C. HERMES, T. KRAMLER, I. TAYLOR and
F. VERZELEN, Commission imposes a penalty payment pursuant to Article 24(2) of Regulation
If2003 on Microsoft, EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 2006, 3, pp. 27-29; T. KRAMLER, C.-C.
." BURR and D. WYNS, The judgment of the Court of First Instance in the Microsoft case, EC Com-
petition Policy Newsletter, 2007, 3, pp. 39-44. See e.g. European Commission, EU competition pol-
·icy and the consumer - a new brochure describing the basic concepts of European competition policy,
2004.
102 See B. VESTERDORF, "Article 82 EC: Where do we stand after the Microsoft judgement?",
available at http://www.icc.qmuLac.uk/GAR/Vesterdorf.pdf.
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allow the Commission to focus on the most serious infringements of
competition law. With the increased reliance on a number of instru-
ments identified in this paper, the Commission could achieve similar
goals. In so far as "sunshine" enforcement instruments encourage
firms voluntarily to comply with the law and assist NCAs and
courts in properly applying Articles 81 and 82 EC, they have the
potential to diminish the number of cases before the Commission.
In this respect, Notices, Guidelines, Communications, Guidance let-
ters, Articles, Papers are particularly relevant.
D. - Decision-making efficiency
The adoption of "sunshine" enforcement instruments is much less
cumbersome than that of legislative measures. As a result, they
allow the Commission to be much more nimble in the course of its
enforcement duties. The swift and timely regulation they are able
to provide increases the efficiency of the Communities decision-
making process and stands in stark contrast with the arcane and
time-consuming traditional legislative procedure (see table below).
Notwithstanding this, several sunshine enforcement instruments
seem to suffer from the same shortcomings (e. g. the Discussion
paper on Article 82 EC which is still to result in the adoption of
guidelines on the application of Article 82 EC). 103
TABLE 2
Timeframe for the adoption of general soft law instruments
Date of Commission DateType of instrument draft (equivalent to
of effective adoption Durationlegislative proposal)
Guidelines on non horizontal May 2007 28 November 2007 5 months
mergers
Guidelines on horizontal mergers 11 December 2002 16 December 2003 1 year
Guidelines on article 81(3) EC 3 October 2003 27 April 2004 6 months
Guidelines on technology trans- 3 October 2003 7 April 2004 6 months
fer agreements
103See Global Competition Policy, Apr-08 (2) and, in particular, L. LOVDAHL-GoRMSEN, "Will
There Be Article 82 Guidelines and What Are the Implications 1"; Cani FERNANDEZ and Albert
PEREDA, "Will There Be Guidelines On Article 82 of the EC Treaty 1"; D. GERARD, "The Com-
mission on Velvet: Why it will probably not issue Article 82 guidelines any time soon".
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E. - Enhancing competition advocacy
Competition Commissioners and in particular Commissioner
Kroes have regularly emphasized the importance of developing a
strong competition culture in the EC. 104 The proliferation of soft
law instruments which are then extensively disseminated to the
public increases the visibility of competition policy for the general
public and thus contributes to its effectiveness (through possible
follow-on actions). In addition, such wider understanding of the role
and virtues of competition law by the public does not serve a mere
informative purpose: it can be expected to increase the legitimacy
of a field of the law where enforcement entails the imposition of
quasi-criminal penalties and where the Commission's action is rou-
tinely met with virulent criticism at Member State level.
IV. - THE VICES
OF SUNSHINE ENFORCEMENT INSTRUMENTS
A. - Poor substantive quality
Very often, the substantive quality of soft law instruments leaves
much to be desired. Their language may not be ideal, the legal
standards and reasoning murky, the terminology inconsistent with
previous practice, etc. These shortcomings negate many of the ben-
efits expected from them. 105 For instance, Guidelines, Notices and
Communications, are not always useful. Their degree of authority
depends on a number of elements: outcome of the consultation
process, wording, formal clarity, etc. Furthermore, those soft law
instruments that are general in nature and designed to cover
abstract categories of anticompetitive conduct are sometimes diffi-
cult to apply to a particular case. 106 In that respect the Guidelines
104 See e.g., Report prepared by the Advocacy Working Group, Advocacy and Competition Pol-
icy, ICN's Conference Naples, Italy, 2002; N. KROES, The Competition Principle as a Guideline
for Legislation and State Action - the Responsibility of Politicians and the Role of Competition
Authorities, 12th International Conference on Competition, Bonn, 6th June 2005; P. LOWE, "Pre-
serving and Promoting Competition: a European Response", Speech, St Gallen Competition Law
Forum, II May 2006; N. KROES, Competitiveness - The common goal of competition and industrial
policies, SPEECH/08/207 of 18th April 2008.
105See European Consumer Law Group, "Soft Law and the Consumer Interest", ECLG/071/
2001, March 2001, pp. 12-21.
106 See C. COOK and N. KHAN, supra, at §1-026. To address these problems, some guidelines
provide examples to clarifY the analysis of particular cases.
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on Article 81(3) EC, which suggest that companies perform a bur-
densome and complex economic analysis to determine whether the
agreements they concluded are lawful (balancing pro-competitive
benefits with anticompetitive effects), are a case in point. 107
B. - Decision-making opacity
The increased efficiency in the decision-making process allowed
by sunshine enforcement instruments is also their Achilles heel. As
a result of their simplified adoption process, a number of such
instruments (in particular, guidelines and other general instru-
ments) are not subject to the scrutiny of the other Community
institutions. This may be a cause of concern where these measures
not only frame the margin of discretion enjoyed by the Commission
in the implementation of competition policy, but also lead to the
imposition of new legal obligations on firms, thereby concealing
quasi-legislative choices (e.g. the guidelines on corrective measures
which clearly favour structural remedies over behavioural ones).
Moreover, although the release of a Commission draft document is
usually followed by a wide consultation process (involving different
stakeholders such as consumer and trade associations, legal experts)
guaranteeing a certain degree of accountability, the Commission is
under no duty to justify its policy choices or give reasons where it
ignores the views volunteered by third parties.
C. - Regulatory mess/inconsistencies
The proliferation of sunshine enforcement instruments leads to a
fragmentation of legal sources which complicates the task of tnose
practising EC competition law. To address this issue, the Commis-
sion has recently sought to aggregate various Notices and similar
Communications dealing with related subjects into single "consoli-
dated" notice(s).108
\07 See Communication from the Commission - Notice - Guidelines on the application of
.iI Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ, C 101, 27.04.2004, pp. 97-118.
\os See Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) N° 139/
2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings of 10 July 2007, which replaces
(i) the Notice on the concept of concentration; (ii) the Notice on the concept of full-function joint
ventures; (iii) the Notice on the concept of undertakings concerned; and (iv) the Notice on cal-
culation of turnover.
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In addition, two (or more) different sunshine enforcement instru-
ments may contain inconsistent legal standards or positions. For
instance, the press release issued following the adoption of the Com-
mission 2004 infringement Decision against Microsoft states that
the Commission assessed Microsoft's behaviour under the "rule of
reason". 109 As noted by different commentators, this statement is
not in line with the views formally expressed by the Commission in
its Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3), which suggest that
such a "rule of reason" tests does not exist in EC competition
law. 110 Such inconsistencies are in all likelihood due to the fact that
different instruments are drafted by different individuals and often
not subject to wide-ranging internal consultation or reviewed by an
overarching organ that would attempt to ensure coherence.
D. - A void judicial review
The question whether sunshine enforcement instruments are ame-
nable to judicial review is of critical importance. The conventional
view, which may be shared by the Commission, is that since only
formal enforcement decisions taken at the "end of the chain" actu-
ally affect the rights and obligations of individual companies
directly, accountability would be sufficiently ensured via judicial
review of these formal, final decisions (i.e. infringement decisions,
etc.). III
Certain authors, such as Larouche and De Vijser, have criticized
this view, contending that it ignores the practical realities of eco-
nomic regulation. Soft law instruments and other forms of informal
action influence the scope and exercise of the powers of a number
or public authorities such as national courts, NCAs and national
regulatory authorities ("NRAs"). A Commission Communication
interpreting the substance of EC competition law will, for instance,
influence the enforcement activities - and in particular, the content
of the decisions - adopted by the NCAs. It can therefore be argued
that the rule of law would be better served if those acts were sub-
109 See Microsoft Questions and Answers on Commission Decision, MEMO/04/70 of 24 March
2004.
110 See VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra at note 205, p. 82.
m This issue is explained at length by Larouche and De Vijser in a paper concerning elec-
tronic communications regulation. See P. LAROUCHE and M. DE VISSER, "The triangular rela-
tionship between the Commission, NRAs and National Courts Revisited", Communications '"
Strategies, 10 January 2006.
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ject to a certain degree of judicial scrutiny and the Commission held
accountable for them. 112
E. - Increase legal uncertainty
or promote controversial legal standards
In certain instances, the Commission will be tempted to offer
guidance on the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC that finds lit-
tle support in the legal standards established by the Community
courts' case-law. These novel interpretations will very often not
give rise to criticism as regards the substantive solutions they entail
because, for instance, the case-law is no longer considered sound in
light of contemporary economic analysis.
This being said, the guidance thus offered will by definition
create legal uncertainty. At least for this reason, these sunshine
enforcement instruments are controversial. For instance, in the
opinion delivered in British Airways, AG Kokott dismissed a
novel legal standard relating to the assessment of rebates
granted by dominant firms proposed by the Commission in the
Discussion Paper on Article 82 EC and recalled that the appli-
cable test remains the one defined by the Community Courts. 113
Subsequently, the Commission and its officials appear however
to have either tried to reconcile the existing case-law with the
pronouncements contained in the Discussion Paper or applied a
new market foreclosure test suggested in the Discussion
Paper. 114 Whichever the case may be, the Commission has
sought to justify its choices through a variety of press releases
and articles published in academic reviews and in the ECcom-
112 By contrast, however, we do not share the pessimism of these authors, when they consider
that recommendations, guidelines and other soft-law instruments are immune from judicial scru-
tiny. The current state of the case-law allows, to a certain extent, to initiate annulment proceed-
ings against soft law instruments. The fact that Article 230 EC does not expressly mention those
acts does not, as confirmed by the Court in the landmark ERTA case, insulate them from judi-
cial scrutiny. See Case C 22/70, Commission v. Council, [1971] E.C.R. 1-263 at §42 ("all acts
adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have legal
effects"). As a matter of principle, informal pronouncements and soft law instruments can be
brought to justice, if they (i) are definitive (and not preparatory); (ii) have been adopted by a
Community institution (in the present case, the Commission); and (iii) produce legal effects on
.1\ a person's situation and affect that person in an adverse manner. See also Case C 294/83, Les
Verts v. Parliament, [1986] E.C.R. 1339 at §24 which states that those acts "intended to have
legal effects vis-a-vis third parties" can be challenged on the basis of Article 230 EC.
113 See supra.
114 See Prokent-Tomra, Commission decision of 29 March 2006, Case COMP/E-1/38.113, not yet
published.
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petition policy newsletter. 115 One such article in particular, con-
cerning a specific infringement decision, stated as follows:
"[the case] was analysed following the previous case law of the European
Court of Justice, in addition to being based and supported by economic anal-
ysis in the spirit of the recently publicised DG Competition Discussion paper
on the application of Article 82 to exclusionary abuses. The case can be con-
sidered an important step towards the envisaged reform of the application of
Article 82 EC Treaty". 116
To complicate matters further, a leading competition economist
has forcefully argued that it is doubtful that the Commission
applied, in that specific case, an effects-based approach analysis
and in particular, the foreclosure test suggested in the Discussion
Paper as claimed. 117 In sum, despite the Commission's guidance,
some of the principles applicable to the analysis of Article 82 EC
cases remain as nebulous as ever.
F. - Discipline market players
without taking a formal decision
In a world driven by information, investors, customers, suppliers,
etc. tend to react vigorously to any signal that may affect the mar-
ket, no matter how insignificant it may be. In that respect, the
mere announcement that a firm is being investigated by the Com-
mission - from which no inference can be drawn that the firm in
question committed an infringement - can potentially have a whole
host of negative and unintended consequences.
For instance, the Commission's increasing practice of disclosing
information on steps of a mere procedural nature talfen in the
context of its enforcement activities can prove extremely harmful
to the firms under investigation. In particular, the public
announcement that the Commission has opened formal proceed-
ings against a firm will often be misconstrued as signifying that
the adoption of a Statement of Objections - setting out the Com-
mission's preliminary view that an infringement has occurred - is
llS See Commission Press Release, Commission imposes € 24 million fine on Tomra group for
abuse of dominant position, IPj06j398 of 29 March 2006; See F.P. MAIER-RIGAUD, "Article 82
Rebates: Four Common Fallacies", mimeo, available on www.ssrn.com;
ll6 F. MAIER-RIGAUD and D. VAIGAUSKAITE, "ProkentjTomra, a textbook case? Abuse of
dominance under perfect information", EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 2, 2006, p. 19.
117 See D. RIDYARD, "The Tomra decision - A disappointing start to the effects-based era of
Article 82 enforcement", Competition Law Insight, 13 February 2007.
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imminent. 118 The Commission seems to be fully aware of this
potential for mischief and is therefore careful to explain that the
initiation of formal proceedings means only that the Commission
will pursue its investigation "as a matter of priority" and does not
in any way prejudge the final outcome of the analysis. 119 This
notwithstanding, this practice will often harm significantly many
firms investigated by the Commission. A recent study by G. Lan-
gus and M. Motta shows, for instance, that the announcement to
the market of a dawn raid has a strong and statistically signifi-
cant effect on the firm's share price, with its cumulative average
abnormal return being approximately ~ 2 %. One cannot exclude
that the heightened public attention, market focus and pressure
brought to bear by investors may, in many cases, induce a firm
under investigation to commit to amend its behaviour in order for
a competition authority to close even incipient proceedings. This
may be an area of real concern where any change in a firm's
behaviour is unwarranted given that a full investigation would in
all likelihood have found no evidence of infringement.
In light of the risks identified above, it is clear that competition
authorities should exercise the utmost caution when making such
public announcements. In that respect, the record of the British
NCA, the Office of Fair Trading ("OFT"), is worth mentioning. In
a 2007 public announcement, the OFT erroneously suggested in a
press release that a firm had committed several infringements of
UK competition law. 120 The firm initiated defamation proceedings.
In April 2008, the OFT acknowledged that its press release con-
liS Until recently the Commission initiated formal proceedings simnltaneously with the adop-
tion of a Statement of Objections. A new trend seems to be emerging whereby the initiation of
formal proceedings precedes and is therefore decoupled from the adoption of a Statement of
Objections. In such cases, the initiation of formal proceedings constitutes a mere procedural
measure which does not imply - and for that reason should not suggest - that a Statement of
Objections will be adopted.
119 See Commission Press Release, Antitrust: Commission initiates formal proceedings against
Qualcomm, MEMO/07/389 of l't October 2007.
120 See OFT Press Release, Wm Morrison Supermarkets pic: an apology, 54/08 of 23 April
2008. The OFT issued a press release at the same time as a Statement of Objections against a
number of large supermarkets and dairy processors, among which Morrisons. However, the press
release incorrectly suggested that Morrisons was the subject of a provisional OFT finding of
infringement in relation to milk, cheese and butter over a two year period (2002 and 2003), and
that Morrisons had previously been warned by the OFT against anti-competitive behaviour. In
fact, the OFT has not made any provisional finding of infringement against Morrisons in relation
to the supply of butter and cheese. Nor had Morrisons been accused of any price fixing activity
after 2002. The only allegation involving Morrisons related to liquid milk products in 2002.
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tained "serious errors". It issued a new press release expressing its
sincere apologies for the publication of erroneous, defamatory alle-
gations and agreed to pay £100,000 in settlement of the defamation
action.
G. - "Buying" time
Finally, the adoption of sunshine enforcement instruments may,
in certain instances, be perceived as merely allowing the Commis-
sion to buy time. For instance, the Commission is under a legal
duty (as guardian of the Treaty) to apply competition law and to
act in a timely fashion in the interests of "good administration". In
cases where its actions have been less than immediate, it may be
tempted to defuse any criticism by issuing a press release of a
merely procedural nature. Similarly, the publication of a consulta-
tion paper in an area where a clarification of competition policy
appears long overdue may allow the Commission to devote more
time to a thorough examination of the topic in question.
V. - CONCLUSION
The proliferation of sunshine enforcement instruments has pros
and cons, supporters and detractors. Whilst its virtues in providing
much needed guidance in certain nebulous areas of EC competition
law as well as its contribution to the effectiveness of the Commis-
sion's enforcement activities are apparent and should not be called
into question, its pitfalls are less well-known.
In our view, the Community courts bear significant responsibility
in ensuring not only that the Commission does not abuse the wide
margin of discretion it enjoys, but also that the Commission's reli-
ance on soft law instruments does not prove inconsistent with
higher sources of Community law.
*'
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